

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE IMPACT OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION ON THE INTEGRATION OF ENLISTED WOMEN

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## ABSTRACT

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Women have played an ever increasingly important role in the United States Army enlisted force over the past few decades. Their proportional strength has risen from 2.6 percent in the early 1970's to 15.5 percent in the present day. While the opportunities for women to serve have grown substantially within the combat support and combat service support occupations, the growth of women has been concentrated mainly in the traditional fields of administration, supply and services, medical and transportation. As the Army moves forward with its transformation to the Stryker Brigade and to the Objective Force Unit of Action design, along with instituting reductions in the administration and logistics force structure, we must assess the potential impact this transformation may have on the continued success of integrating women into the enlisted force.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	III
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	VII
LIST OF TABLES .....	IX
THE IMPACT OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION ON THE INTEGRATION OF ENLISTED WOMEN.....	1
THE EVOLUTION OF WOMEN IN THE ARMY.....	1
CURRENT ASSIGNMENT POLICIES.....	4
CURRENT UTILIZATION OF WOMEN .....	7
THE TRANSFORMATION ROAD MAP .....	11
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF TRANSFORMATION ON WOMEN IN THE ENLISTED FORCE .....	12
THE COMBINED IMPACT OF TRANSFORMATION ON THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN .....	19
COURSES OF ACTION TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM .....	20
CONCLUSION.....	22
ENDNOTES.....	25
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	29



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1.....	4
FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES COMPRISING SOME TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS .....	11
FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES COMPRISING SOME NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS .....	11





## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES CLOSED TO WOMEN.....	5
TABLE 2. INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS BY CMF.....	6
TABLE 3. FEMALE SOLDIER INVENTORY BY CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELD.....	8
TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES FILLING INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS BY CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELD.....	9
TABLE 5. LIGHT BRIGADE TASK FORCE INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS.....	13
TABLE 6. SBCT INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS.....	13
TABLE 7. IMPACT ON INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS UPON TRANSITION TO THE FIRST FIVE SBCT'S .....	14
TABLE 8. LIGHT BRIGADE AND SBCT INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS IN THE MORE TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS.....	14
TABLE 9. HEAVY BRIGADE TASK FORCE INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS.....	15
TABLE 10. UNIT OF ACTION DESIGN INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS.....	16
TABLE 11. INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS IN THE UNIT OF ACTION DESIGN VERSUS LEGACY AND SBCT STRUCTURE .....	17
TABLE 12. LEGACY FORCE, SBCT, AND UNIT OF ACTION DESIGN INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS IN THE MORE TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS .....	17
TABLE 13. IMPACT OF TRANSFORMATION ON INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS AND FEMALE STRENGTH.....	20
TABLE 14. IMPACT OF TRANSFORMATION ON TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS AND FEMALE STRENGTH.....	20



## **THE IMPACT OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION ON THE INTEGRATION OF ENLISTED WOMEN**

As the Army moves ahead with transformation we must consider the impact this transformation will have on the overall integration of women in the enlisted Army. Many aspects of transformation must be defined as they relate to organizations, occupations and doctrine; therefore, the exact impact of transformational changes is difficult to quantify. What can be quantified and analyzed are the following three aspects of transformation. First, there is the transition of the Army's legacy light infantry brigades and armored cavalry regiment to the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Second, is the eventual transition of the remaining legacy force units and SBCT's to the Objective Force (Unit of Action). Third, is the planned reduction in the combat service support (CSS) structure in Total Army Analysis (TAA) 09-11 that will support the transformed Army both on the operational and institutional sides. Opportunities for women to serve in the enlisted ranks have increased dramatically over the past twenty years, leading to an ever-increasing percentage of women in the enlisted force. If the intent of Army leadership is to maintain or continue to expand women's roles and opportunities in the enlisted force, then the transformation of our fighting organizations and the reduction of CSS positions supporting these organizations must not be an impediment to that integration.

### **THE EVOLUTION OF WOMEN IN THE ARMY**

During World War II, the 350,000 women who served in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) were employed mainly in the administration and medical fields and were considered temporary support to free more men for combat related duty. After World War II, President Truman and Congress passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act, which gave women a permanent place in the military services, but also placed a limit on the number of women who could serve. This law stipulated that women could make up no more than 2 percent of the total enlisted force, could not serve as commanders, could not be promoted above the permanent grade of Lieutenant Colonel, and could not be assigned to combat ships or aircraft. Because this combat exclusion applied mainly to the Navy and Air Force, the Army followed Congressional intent and created guidelines that prevented women from serving in units and in occupations that involved direct combat<sup>1</sup>.

Since the 1948 Women's Armed Services Integration Act, opportunities for women to serve in the Army enlisted force have increased dramatically. In 1967, Congress lifted the 2 percent cap on women in the enlisted force and allowed women to serve as general officers.

However, the services still maintained the authority to determine its combat exclusion policy, and with that, the Army could still assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of members of the Army without restriction.

The 1970's brought even more opportunities for women. On the officer side, in 1972 the Reserve Officers Training Corps was opened to women and in 1976 the first women were enrolled in the service academies. In 1977, the Army changed its policies and opened many previously closed military occupational specialties (MOS) to women. In 1978, the WACC was eliminated and the Department of Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense establish guidelines for the assignment and utilization of women in the Army. The Secretary of the Army, who already had the authority under Title 10, Section 3012 to establish the assignment policies for Army personnel, created the Combat Exclusion Policy. This policy stated:

Women are authorized to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty except those specified at any unit of the Army except Infantry, Armor, Cannon Field Artillery, Combat Engineer, and Low Altitude Air Defense Artillery units of battalion/squadron size or smaller. Women may not serve on Scout or Attack helicopters<sup>2</sup>

The Army also created the Direct Combat Probability Code (DCPC) system to support the new exclusion policy. The codes ranged from P1 to P7; the lower the P-rating, the higher the probability of routine engagement in direct combat. As a result of this exclusion policy 55 MOS were closed to women equating to 29 percent of the Army's enlisted authorizations. Additionally, another 18 percent of the enlisted authorizations were closed to women based on the DCPC system<sup>3</sup>. These positions excluded women based on MOS duties, unit mission, and type of unit or for other reasons. Combining the two categories reveals that 47 percent of all enlisted spaces were closed to women when the exclusion policy and DCPC system went into effect.

In 1988 the Department of Defense (DOD) created the Risk Rule, which set a single evaluative standard for all the services to use when classifying specialties and units as male only. The impact on the Army was that women would be excluded from certain non-combat units or areas on the battlefield if the risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire or capture were equal to or greater than the risk experienced by associated combat units in the same theater of operations.

Following the repeal of the prohibition on the assignment of women to combat aircraft in 1993, Secretary of Defense Aspin directed the services to open up more specialties and assignments to women; however, he allowed the Army and Marines to continue to exclude

women from direct combat positions. His memorandum to the services stated “ Two years ago, Congress repealed the law that prohibited women from being assigned to combat aircraft. It is now time to implement that mandate and address the remaining restrictions on the assignment of women.”

Two significant changes in law and policy were instituted in 1994 which were major steps forward in expanding the opportunities for women in the Army. First, The National Defense Authorization Act established guidelines for the integration of women specialties previously closed. The Act stated:

- Ensure that qualification for and continuance in occupational career fields is evaluated on the basis of a common, relevant performance standard and not on the basis of gender;
- Refrain from the use of gender quotas, goals, or ceilings, except as specifically authorized by Congress; and
- Refrain from changing occupational standards simply to increase or decrease the number of women in an occupational career field<sup>4</sup>

Second, Secretary of Defense Aspin rescinded the Risk Rule and established a DOD wide direct ground combat assignment rule which allows women to be assigned to all positions in which they qualify; but exempts them for serving in units below brigade headquarters level because the primary mission is direct ground combat. Direct ground combat was defined as:

engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with hostile force's personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.<sup>5</sup>

As a direct result of these evolutionary policy changes governing the assignment and utilization of women, there are now greater opportunities for women to serve. Correspondingly, the number of women as a percent of the enlisted force has steadily increased. As shown in Figure 1, the Army's enlisted female population has increased six-fold over the past 29 years.

As far back as 1973, women constituted only 2.6 percent of the Active Army.<sup>6</sup> As of 1 September 2002 there were 62,552 enlisted women in the Active Army, which includes both the operating strength and the Training, Transient, Hospital and School (TTHS) account. This figure constitutes 15.5 percent of the total active enlisted force<sup>7</sup>.

### Women as a Percent of the Army Active Component




FIGURE 1

### CURRENT ASSIGNMENT POLICIES

The Army assignment policy regarding women instituted in January 1994 under Secretary of Defense Aspin is still governing assignment and utilization policies in 2002. This policy follows the DOD-wide direct ground combat assignment rule which allows all service members to be assigned to all positions for which they qualify, but excludes women from serving in combat arms occupations (infantry, armor, field artillery, special forces, and short range air defense artillery) and in units below brigade level whose primary mission is ground combat.<sup>8</sup>

Under these guidelines 193 of 225 or 88 percent of MOS's are open to women, and only 32 MOS's are closed to women<sup>9</sup> (as of 1 Sep 02). This compares to 55 MOS's that were closed to women prior to Secretary Aspin's decision to eliminate the Risk Rule in 1994<sup>10</sup>. Table 1 shows the MOS's currently closed to women. The rationale for closing these 32 occupations was based on either the direct ground combat role, in the case of the combat arms MOS's, or the fact that the positions primarily located in direct ground combat units below brigade headquarters level, as is the case with the maintenance and intelligence MOS's.

MOS	Title	MOS	Title
11B	Infantryman	18D	SF Medical Sergeant
11C	Indirect Fire Infantryman	18E	SF Communications Sergeant
11Z	Infantry Senior Sergeant	18F	SF Ass't Ops and Intel Sergeant
12B	Combat Engineer	18Z	SF Senior Sergeant
13B	Cannon Crewmember	19D	Cavalry Scout
13C	Tactical Automated Fire Control Systems Specialist	19K	M1 Armor Crewman
13D	Field Artillery Automated Tactical Data System Specialist	19Z	Armor Senior Sergeant
13E	Cannon Fire Direction Specialist	45D	Self-Propelled Field Artillery Turret Mechanic

13F	Fire Support Specialist	45E	M1 Abrams Tank Turret Mechanic
13M	MLRS Crewmember	45T	Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Turret Mechanic
13P	MLRS Operational Fire Direction Specialist	63A	M1 Abrams Tank System Maintainer
13R	Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator	63D	Artillery Mechanic
14R	Bradley Linebacker Crewmember	63E	M1 Abrams Tank Systems Mechanic
14S	Avenger Crewmember	63M	Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Maintainer
18B	SF Weapons Sergeant	63T	Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Mechanic
18C	SF Engineer Sergeant	96R	Ground Surveillance Systems Operator

TABLE 1. MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES CLOSED TO WOMEN

While the Army rescinded the risk rule and coding of positions from P1 to P7 to reflect the probability of engaging in direct combat, it did retain a form of probability coding. The Army codes all enlisted positions as either “E” male only or “I” interchangeable meaning men or women can fill the position. This coding system takes into account both the MOS’s that are closed to women and the prohibition of women serving in units that engage in direct ground combat below brigade headquarters level. Therefore, all of the 32 MOS’s closed to women found on Modified Table of Organization & Equipment (MTOE’s) and Table of Distribution & Allowances (TDA’s), and all positions in units below brigade headquarters level that engage in direct ground combat are coded “E”. All other positions are coded as “I”.

With this current coding system, even though 86 percent of occupational specialties are open to women, they can serve in only 65 percent of all positions because the remaining slots are in direct ground combat units below brigade headquarters level<sup>11</sup>. Table 2 shows how each Career Management Field and its authorizations are coded<sup>12</sup>. Of the 349,686 authorizations in the enlisted force structure, 225,734 (65 percent) are coded as interchangeable and the remaining 123,952 (35 percent) are coded male only<sup>13</sup>.

Combat Arms	Male	Interchangeable	Total	% Interchangeable
CMF 11/Infantry	43388	0	43388	0%
CMF 12/Combat Engineering	8430	658	9088	7%
CMF 13/Field Artillery	20606	469	21075	2%
CMF 14/Air Defense Artillery	4365	3382	7747	44%
CMF 18/Special Forces	3382	0	3382	0%
CMF 19/Armor	16354	0	16354	0%
Total Combat Arms	96525	4509	101034	4%
Combat Support	Male	Interchangeable	Total	% Interchangeable
CMF 25/Commo & Info Ops	320	5421	5741	94%



CMF 31/Signal Ops	2783	20449	23232	88%
CMF 37/Psych Ops	109	394	503	78%
CMF 51/Gen Eng	293	5099	5392	95%
CMF 54/Chemical	1128	4980	6108	82%
CMF 55/Ammunition	44	3322	3366	99%
CMF 81/Topo Eng	0	839	839	100%
CMF 93/Aviation Ops	66	2910	2976	98%
CMF 95/Military Police	0	14309	14309	100%
CMF 96/Military Intelligence	1253	6224	7477	83%
CMF 98/Sig Intel/Elec Warfare Ops	157	5843	6000	97%
Total Combat Support	6153	69790	75943	92%
Combat Service Support	Male	Interchangeable	Total	% Interchangeable
CMF 27/Para Legal	189	1319	1508	87%
CMF 33/Elec Warfare/Intercept Sys Maint	19	817	836	98%
CMF 35/Elec Maint & Calibration	263	5228	5491	95%
CMF 46/Public Affairs	6	623	629	99%
CMF 56/Religious Spt	175	1122	1297	87%
CMF 63/Mech Maint	3994	29748	33742	88%
CMF 67/Aircraft Maint	711	12298	13009	95%
CMF 71/Admin	1254	20893	22147	94%
CMF 77/Petro & Water	1866	6821	8687	79%
CMF 79/Retention & Recruiting	4	3944	3948	100%
CMF 92/Supply & Services	7247	28582	35829	80%
CMF 88/Transportation	1169	13821	14990	92%
CMF 91/Medical	4137	23414	27551	85%
CMF 97/Band	0	1855	1855	100%
Total Combat Service Support	21034	150485	171519	88%
00Z Sergeants Major	240	950	1190	80%
Total Army	123952	225734	349686	65%

TABLE 2. INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS BY CMF

Note that the percent of interchangeable positions in the combat arms is quite low, except in Air Defense Artillery. This makes sense since there are only a few combat arms MOS's open to women and because the only combat arms battalions open to women are engineer construction battalions and patriot battalions. The combat arms MOS's open to women are: Bridge Crewmember, Combat Engineer Senior Sergeant, Field Artillery Surveyor, Field Artillery Meteorological Crewmember, Patriot Fire Control Operator, Air Defense Artillery C4I Tactical Operations Center Enhanced Operator, Patriot Launching Station Operator, and Air Defense Artillery Senior Sergeant<sup>14</sup>.

There are far greater opportunities for women to serve in the combat support and combat service support MOS's. We find that 92 percent of combat support and 88 percent of combat

service support positions are open to women. Again, this is not surprising since all MOS's in these CMF's are open to women and the densities of these MOS's in the prohibited combat units is relatively small.

### **CURRENT UTILIZATION OF WOMEN**

While there has been a significant and steady increase in the proportion of women soldiers over the last 20 years, women today still tend to serve in the same traditional occupations as their predecessors. Table 3 shows the number of men and women and the proportion of women in each of the Career Management Fields<sup>15</sup>.

Combat Arms	Female	Male	Total	Female %
CMF 11/Infantry	0	52979	52979	0%
CMF 12/Engineer	121	9649	9770	1%
CMF 13/Field Artillery	98	24350	24448	0%
CMF 14/Air Defense Artillery	649	9676	10325	6%
CMF18/Special Forces	0	4289	4289	0%
CMF 19/Armor	0	18789	18789	0%
Total Combat Arms	868	119732	120600	1%
Combat Support	Female	Male	Total	Female %
CMF 25/Commo & Info Ops	1907	4983	6890	28%
CMF 31/Signal Ops	3148	24254	27402	11%
CMF 37/Psych Ops	56	551	607	9%
CMF 51/Gen Eng	523	5863	6386	8%
CMF 54/Chemical	1420	5158	6578	22%
CMF 55/Ammunition	929	3240	4169	22%
CMF 81/Topo Eng	314	759	1073	29%
CMF 93/Aviation Ops	841	2553	3394	25%
CMF 95/Military Police	2554	13528	16082	16%
CMF 96/Military Intelligence	1670	7776	9446	18%
CMF 98/Sig Intel/Elec Warfare Ops	2224	5874	8098	27%
Total Combat Support	15586	74539	90125	17%
Combat Service Support	Female	Male	Total	Female %
CMF 27/Para Legal	643	970	1613	40%
CMF 33/Elec Warfare/Intercept Sys Maint	87	1017	1104	8%
CMF 35/Elec Maint & Calibration	824	6184	7008	12%
CMF 46/Public Affairs	247	475	722	34%
CMF 56/Religious Spt	345	1003	1348	26%
CMF 63/Mech Maint	2982	35719	38701	8%
CMF 67/Aircraft Maint	706	14723	15429	5%
CMF 71/Admin	10062	12732	22794	44%
CMF 77/Petro & Water	2104	8006	10110	21%
CMF 79/Retention & Recruiting	334	3695	4029	8%
CMF 92/Supply & Services	13673	26941	40614	34%
CMF 88/Transportation	3681	12766	16447	22%
CMF 91/Medical	9990	20712	30702	33%

CMF 97/Band	349	1562	1911	18%
Total Combat Service Support	46027	146505	192532	24%
00Z-Sergeants Major	71	1207	1278	6%
Total Army	62552	341983	404535	15%

TABLE 3. FEMALE SOLDIER INVENTORY BY CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELD

Note the proportional differences of women between the various CMF's. Since women comprise 15.5 percent of the total enlisted force, we can look at each CMF's percentage of women to determine those that have a higher proportion as well as those with a lower proportion. These differences can be attributed to individual preference and qualification during recruitment, as well as opportunities available, accessions targets and MOS female strength ceilings.

Women make up only 1 percent of the combat arms even though 4 percent of the positions are open to them. This is likely to be more a factor of individual preference and qualification than of the other factors since the accessions targets set each year are well above what is recruited<sup>16</sup>. In CMF 14-Air Defense Artillery, while 44 percent of the positions are open to women, they constitute only 6 percent of the inventory. In CMF 12-Combat Engineering, 7 percent of the positions are open to women, yet they make up only 1 percent of the inventory. In CMF 13-Field Artillery, 2 percent of the positions are open to women, yet they constitute less than a half percent of the inventory.

In the combat support and combat service support CMF's, we also see huge differences between the number of positions open and female fill levels. However, since the vast majority of positions are coded interchangeable, the differences between fill levels and positions open is reflective of female accessions targets and the established MOS female strength ceilings. As an example, in combat service support the huge difference between the positions open to women (88 percent), versus women proportion of the inventory (24 percent) is not indicative of a shortage of women. In reality, if the 62,552 women were spread evenly through the force, with 15.5 percent of each CMF female, we would see some vastly different fill levels.

Simply comparing the level of female fill to make judgments on whether the CMF has too many or too few females is not a valid analysis because it does not take into account opportunities for females to serve in the CMF. To ensure a fair comparison of women fill in the CMF's we need to look at the proportion of women that fill the interchangeable positions. In this analysis it is important to use operating strength (total strength minus TTHS) and not total strength since we are comparing the actual fill of positions in units. Table 4 provides this comparison<sup>17</sup>.

	Female Operating Strength	Interchangeable Positions	% Interchangeable Positions Female
Combat Arms			
CMF 11/Infantry	0	0	0%
CMF 12/Combat Engineering	101	658	15%
CMF 13/Field Artillery	91	469	19%
CMF 14/Air Defense Artillery	462	3382	14%
CMF 18/Special Forces	0	0	0%
CMF 19/Armor	0	0	0%
Total Combat Arms	654	4509	15%
	Female Strength	Interchangeable Positions	% Interchangeable Positions Female
Combat Support			
CMF 25/Como & Info Ops	1695	5421	31%
CMF 31/Signal Ops	2499	20449	12%
CMF 37/Psych Ops	36	394	9%
CMF 51/Gen Eng	428	5099	8%
CMF 54/Chemical	1237	4980	25%
CMF 55/Ammunition	850	3322	26%
CMF 81/Topo Eng	228	839	27%
CMF 93/Aviation Ops	734	2910	25%
CMF 95/Military Police	2177	14309	15%
CMF 96/Military Intelligence	1320	6224	21%
CMF 98/Sig Intel/Elec Warfare Ops	1536	5843	26%
Total Combat Support	12740	69790	18%
	Female Strength	Interchangeable Positions	% Interchangeable Positions Female
Combat Service Support			
CMF 27/Para Legal	569	1319	43%
CMF 33/Elec Warfare/Intercept Sys Maint	54	817	7%
CMF 35/Elec Maint & Calibration	634	5228	12%
CMF 46/Public Affairs	207	623	33%
CMF 56/Religious Spt	311	1122	28%
CMF 63/Mech Maint	2445	29748	8%
CMF 67/Aircraft Maint	536	12298	4%
CMF 71/Admin	9461	20893	45%
CMF 77/Petro & Water	1932	6821	28%
CMF 79/Retention & Recruiting	325	3944	8%
CMF 92/Supply & Services	11985	28582	42%
CMF 88/Transportation	3271	13821	24%
CMF 91/Medical	8432	23414	36%
CMF 97/Band	317	1855	17%
Total Combat Service Support	40479	150485	27%
00Z Sergeants Major	71	950	7%
Total Army	53944	225734	24%

TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES FILLING INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS BY CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELD

We see from Table 4 that women fill 24 percent of the 225,734 interchangeable positions. With this 24 percent as the benchmark, again we find that women are underrepresented in the combat arms and combat support CMF's and over represented in the combat service support CMF's. In combat arms women fill on average only 15 percent of the positions open to them with CMF 12 Combat Engineering at 15 percent; CMF 13 Field Artillery at 19 percent; and CMF 14 Air Defense Artillery at 14 percent. In combat support, women fill on average only 18 percent of the positions open to them. There are some sizeable fluctuations with highs of 31 percent fill in CMF 25 Communications & Information Operations; 27 percent in CMF 81 Topographical Engineering; and 26 percent in both CMF 55 Ammunition and CMF 98 Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Operations to lows of 8 percent in CMF 51 General Engineering and 9 percent in CMF 37 Psychological Operations. In combat service support, women fill on average 27 percent of the positions open to them. The high end CMF's are 45 percent in CMF 71 Administration; 43 percent in CMF 27 Para-legal; 42 percent in CMF 92 Supply & Services and 36 percent in CMF 91 Medical. At the low end for combat service support we find 4 percent in CMF 67 Aircraft maintenance; 7 percent in CMF 33 Electronic Warfare/Interception Systems Maintenance; and 8 percent in CMF 63 Mechanical Maintenance. These figures show that despite the sizeable growth rate of women as a proportion of the enlisted force and the ample opportunity for women to serve across the spectrum of positions and occupations as a result of adoption of the Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule in 1994, the Army has failed to obtain balanced growth as measured at the CMF level of detail.

The overall increase in women as a percent of the force is mainly due to percentage increases in the traditional fields of administration, medical, supply and service, and transportation. Note that all of these occupations are in the Combat Service Support (CSS) branches of the Army. Figure 2 shows a comparison of concentrations of women in some of the traditional occupations in 2002<sup>18</sup> versus 1980<sup>19</sup>, 1986<sup>20</sup>, and 1995<sup>21</sup>. Administration has seen a 19 percent increase in females since 1980; Medical and Transportation both a 10 percent increase; and Supply & Services a 20 percent increase. These proportional increases are much higher than the 6.5 percent increase in women as a proportion of the enlisted force from 1980 (9 percent) to 2002 (15.5 percent).




FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES COMPRISING SOME TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS

While women proportionally have increased in the CSS occupations, they remain underrepresented in the more nontraditional occupations such as field artillery, air defense artillery, signal, maintenance, and general engineering. Figure 3 shows the proportional increases of females in these nontraditional occupations, again comparing 2002<sup>22</sup> with 1980<sup>23</sup>, 1986<sup>24</sup> and 1995<sup>25</sup>.




FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES COMPRISING SOME NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS

Opening more positions to women and expanding female accessions has resulted in the continued gender concentration in the more traditional occupations. Of the 62,552 enlisted women in the active Army today, close to 46,000<sup>26</sup> or 73 percent serve in the CSS branches and 39,000<sup>27</sup> or 63 percent serve in the traditional occupations noted in Figure 3.

## THE TRANSFORMATION ROAD MAP

There are three key elements of transformation under consideration that will reduce the number of interchangeable positions and along with that, the number of CSS positions.

Therefore these elements have the potential to impede and even reverse the consistent progress women have made over the years in integrating into the enlisted force.

The first element is the planned transition of four active component legacy force light infantry brigade task forces and one Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to the SBCT organization. Under current planning, these five legacy units will transition to the SBCT Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) by 2006. The 3d Brigade, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, both at Fort Lewis, will complete their transition by Spring 2003. Under current planning, the 172d Infantry Brigade in Alaska will transition in 2004, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Polk will transition in 2005, and the 2d Brigade, 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Hawaii will transition in 2006<sup>28</sup>.

The second element of transformation that could impact on women's integration is the planned transition of all 33 of the legacy brigades/ACR's and SBCT's to the Unit of Action design organization. Current planning documents show that the first Unit of Action will be fielded in 2008. By 2020, 15 brigades will have made the transition, and by 2030, all 33 of the legacy units and SBCT's will have been transformed to the Unit of Action<sup>29</sup>. An assumption is that there will be no force structure cuts which would reduce the number of brigades transforming.

The third element of transformation that could impact on women's integration is the planned reductions in logistics and administrative positions from the force structure as a bill payer for the SBCT's/Objective Force and to reduce the Army's logistics footprint in the combat zone. This is a valid assumption based on published statements of intent to reduce the logistics footprint through technology and development of new logistics concepts<sup>30</sup>.

## **THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF TRANSFORMATION ON WOMEN IN THE ENLISTED FORCE**

To assess the impact of these three elements of transformation on female integration in the enlisted force we must make several comparisons. First we must assess the impact of transforming the five active component legacy brigades/ACR to the SBCT structure. Next we must assess the impact of transforming all of the 33 active component brigades and ACR's to the Unit of Action structure and lastly, we must assess the impact of planned CSS force structure cuts in TAA 09-11. In these comparisons, it is important to look not only at the impacts on the number of interchangeable positions, but also on the impacts on the more traditional occupations of administration, medical, supply and services, and transportation where women densities are highest.

First we will assess the potential impact transition to the five SBCT's may have on female integration. It is important to note that the five planned active component SBCT's are all light infantry or light cavalry type brigades/regiments. Table 5 shows the number of interchangeable positions in a typical light infantry brigade task force and Table 6 shows the number of interchangeable positions in the SBCT<sup>31</sup>.

UNIT	AUTHS	MEN ONLY	INTER-CHANGEABLE	% INTER
HHC	55	8	47	85%
IN BN	535	535	0	0%
IN BN	535	535	0	0%
IN BN	535	535	0	0%
FA BN	559	559	0	0%
ENG BN	465	464	1	0%
ADA BTRY	77	4	73	95%
MI CO	76	0	76	100%
SIG CO	134	0	134	100%
MP PLT	23	0	23	100%
CM PLT	19	0	19	100%
FSB	211	0	211	100%
PSB Det	64	0	64	100%
FIN Det	20	0	20	100%
MSB Slice	40	0	40	100%
TOTAL	3348	2640	708	21%

TABLE 5. LIGHT BRIGADE TASK FORCE INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS

UNIT	AUTHS	MEN ONLY	INTER-CHANGEABLE	% INTER
HHC	71	33	38	54%
IN BN	550	550	0	0%
IN BN	550	550	0	0%
IN BN	550	550	0	0%
FA BN	259	259	0	0%
ENG CO	114	114	0	0%
MI CO	58	0	58	100%
SIG CO	68	0	68	100%
SPT BN	343	0	343	100%
CSS CO	225	0	225	100%
AT CO	47	47	0	0%
RSTA BN	389	389	0	0%
TOTAL	3224	2492	732	23%

TABLE 6. SBCT INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS

Light brigade task forces have 708 interchangeable positions comprising 21 percent of the task force totals, whereas the SBCT has 732 interchangeable positions comprising 23 percent



of the force. Therefore, transitioning the four light brigade task forces and ACR to the SBCT actually creates 120 more interchangeable positions. Table 7 shows the overall change to interchangeable positions once this transition occurs.

UNIT	INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS	NUMBER OF BDES	TOTAL INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS	
HVY BDE TASK FORCE	957	18	17226	
LT BDE TASK FORCE	708	15	10620	
TOTAL			27846	27846
HVY BDE TASK FORCE	957	18	17226	
LT BDE TASK FORCE	708	10	7080	
SBCT	732	5	3660	
TOTAL			27966	27966
INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS GAIN/LOSS				120

TABLE 7. IMPACT ON INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS UPON TRANSITION TO THE FIRST FIVE SBCT'S

However, we need to look at the number of interchangeable positions in the more traditional occupations to fully determine the impact this first element of transformation will have on women. Table 8 compares the number of interchangeable positions in a typical light infantry brigade task force to the SBCT structure, specifically in the more traditional occupations.

	LIGHT BRIGADE INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS	SBCT INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS	DELTA	DELTA x 5
CMF				
71-ADMINISTRATION	88	27	-61	-305
91-MEDICAL	65	56	-9	-45
92-SUPPLY & SERVICES	118	172	54	270
88-TRANSPORTATION	41	47	6	30
TOTAL	312	302	-10	-50

TABLE 8. LIGHT BRIGADE AND SBCT INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS IN THE MORE TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS

As a result of this comparison, we find that while there is an overall increase of 120 interchangeable positions, there are reductions in administration and medical positions and corresponding increases in supply and service and transportation positions. The net change is a loss of 10 interchangeable positions in the more traditional occupations for each of the SBCT transitions and a total loss of 50 for the five SBCT's.

The overall impact of transitioning the five legacy force brigades/ACR to the SBCT on opportunities for women to serve at brigade level will be minimal. However, opportunities to serve in administration, where they comprise 45 percent of the interchangeable positions are cut substantially. Therefore more women will have to be recruited to serve in supply and services, transportation or in some of the nontraditional occupations to offset the loss in administration and medical.

Next, we will look what impact transforming all 33 of the legacy brigade task forces, ACR's, and SBCT's to the Unit of Action will have on women's integration. In this analysis, we will compare transforming the 5 SBCT's, and the remaining 10 legacy light brigades and 18 legacy heavy brigades/ACR. Table 9 shows the number of interchangeable positions in a typical heavy brigade task force<sup>32</sup>.

UNIT	AUTHS	MEN ONLY	INTER CHANGEABLE	% INTER
HHC	52	14	38	73%
MECH BN	678	678	0	0%
MECH BN	678	678	0	0%
AR BN	462	462	0	0%
FA BN	458	448	10	2%
ENG BN	465	464	1	0%
ADA BTRY	77	4	73	95%
MI CO	76	0	76	100%
SIG CO	134	0	134	100%
MP PLT	23	0	23	100%
CM PLT	19	0	19	100%
FSB	402	0	402	100%
PSB Det	64	0	64	100%
Fin Det	20	0	20	100%
MSB Slice	97	0	97	100%
TOTAL	3705	2748	957	26%

TABLE 9. HEAVY BRIGADE TASK FORCE INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS

A typical heavy brigade has 957 interchangeable positions, comprising 26 percent of the force. Table 6 shows that the SBCT has a total of 732 interchangeable positions, comprising 23 percent of the force and Table 5 shows that the light brigade has 708 interchangeable positions, comprising 21 percent of the force. Since the Unit of Action design does not go into MOS and interchangeable position level detail we make the following assumption: the Unit of Action will have the same proportion of interchangeable positions as the SBCT in units where women may serve. This affects only the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) and the Signal

and Military Intelligence Companies. With this assumption in mind, the Unit of Action organization will have 345 interchangeable positions, comprising 16 percent of the force as shown in Table 10.<sup>33</sup>

UNIT	AUTHS	MEN ONLY	INTER CHANGEABLE	% INTER
HHC	67	31	36	54%
CA BN	522	522	0	0%
CA BN	522	522	0	0%
CA BN	522	522	0	0%
NLOS BN	135	135	0	0%
AVN DET	119	119	0	0%
MI CO	38	0	38	100%
SIG CO	45	0	45	100%
FSB	226	0	226	100%
TOTAL	2196	1851	345	16%

TABLE 10. UNIT OF ACTION DESIGN INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS

Comparing the total of interchangeable positions in the legacy heavy brigade task forces, legacy light brigade task forces, legacy ACR and the SBCT's to the Unit of Action design we find that there is a sizeable loss of interchangeable positions once all 33 legacy/SBCT structures are transformed. Table 11 shows the changes. There is an overall loss of 16,581 interchangeable positions. Since women fill 24 percent of interchangeable positions in the inventory, we could anticipate that the Army would lose up to 3,979 women (24 percent of 16,581). This equates to 6.4 percent of their current population of 62,552. A loss of 3,979 women would reduce their proportion of the enlisted force from the current 15.5 percent to 14.5 percent.

UNIT	INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS	NUMBER OF BDES	TOTAL INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS
HVY BDE TASK FORCE	957	18	17226
LT BDE TASK FORCE	708	10	7080

SBCT	732	5	3660
TOTAL			27966
UNIT OF ACTION	345	33	11385
INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS LOST			16581

TABLE 11. INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS IN THE UNIT OF ACTION DESIGN VERSUS  
LEGACY AND SBCT STRUCTURE

Again, for a better comparison we need to look at the number of interchangeable positions in the more traditional occupations to fully determine the impact the second element of transformation will have on women. There are a total of 11,362 traditional CMF interchangeable positions in the legacy/SBCT force prior to transformation to the Unit of Action design. The Unit of Action design does not go into MOS level detail therefore, we do not know the exact MOS position totals in these traditional CMF's. However, we can estimate the number of these positions in the Unit of Action design based on the proportions found in the SBCT. To be as conservative as possible in the analysis, we will use the same proportions. Under this assumption, the Unit of Action would have 4,686 traditional CMF interchangeable positions. In reality it is more likely that the Unit of Action will have less traditional CMF interchangeable positions compared to the SBCT since the desire is to continually reduce the CSS structure. Table 12 shows this comparison.

CMF	HVY BDE				UNIT OF ACTION INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS X 33	DELTA
	LT BDE INTER- CHANGEABLE POSITIONS x 10	INTER- CHANGEABLE POSITIONS x 18	SBCT INTER- CHANGEABLE POSITIONS x 5	TOTAL		
71-ADMIN	880	1692	135	2707	429	-2278
91-MEDICAL	650	1458	280	2388	858	-1530
92-SUPPLY&SER	1180	2844	860	4884	2673	-2211
88-TRANS	410	738	235	1383	726	-657
TOTAL	3120	6732	1510	11362	4686	-6676

TABLE 12. LEGACY FORCE, SBCT, AND UNIT OF ACTION DESIGN INTERCHANGEABLE  
POSITIONS IN THE MORE TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS

From this analysis we can anticipate the elimination of 6,676 positions in the more traditional occupations as a result of transformation from the legacy and SBCT structures to the Unit of Action design. Equating this position reduction to personnel, in the Administration CMF, women fill 45 percent of the interchangeable positions; therefore, the elimination of 2,278 positions equates to a loss of 1,025 women. In the Medical CMF, women fill 36 percent of the

interchangeable positions; therefore the elimination of 1,530 positions equates to a loss of 551 women. In the Supply and Services CMF, women fill 42 percent of the interchangeable positions; therefore the elimination of 2,211 positions equates to a loss of 929 women. Finally, in the Transportation CMF, women fill 24 percent of the interchangeable positions; therefore a loss of 657 positions equates to a loss of 158 women. Combined, the total reduction in women from the inventory could add up to 2,663 in the traditional occupations alone, which is 4.3 percent of the current inventory. This loss of 2,663 women would reduce their proportion of the enlisted force from the current 15.5 percent to 14.8 percent.

The actual reduction in women once the Army transitions to the Unit of Action would be somewhere in between the 3,979 figure and the 2,663 figure. Therefore, the percentage of women in the enlisted force would drop from the current 15.5 percent to somewhere between 14.5 and 14.8 percent.

Lastly, we must assess the impact transformation of logistics and personnel organizations and doctrine will have on women's integration. For the purpose of this analysis, we will quantify this part of transformation as equaling the planned CSS force structure cuts in TAA 09-11. TAA 09-11 reductions are not all inclusive of logistical or personnel transformation, but the TAA reflects actual numeric proposals on the table.

First we will look at the planned drawdown of 71L Administrative Specialist. The current Personnel Manning Authorization Document (PMAD) contains 10,000 71L requirements and 8,986 authorizations<sup>34</sup>. There are 8,734 71L soldiers in the active inventory of which 4,418 are women (51 percent)<sup>35</sup>. TAA09 and the initiative to replace some 71L's in units with 74B Information Systems Operator-Analysts will reduce requirements by 1,331<sup>36</sup>. The TOE Force Development Update reduces the requirements by 3,500 and future TDA cuts reduce the requirements another 2,000<sup>37</sup>. Combined, these requirement reductions take 71L from 10,000 to 3,000, which is a 70 percent cut in total requirements. To translate these future requirements to authorizations is guess work at this time. However, if the same requirements to authorizations ratio were to exist as it does today then 3,000 requirements translates into 2,696 authorizations. We also do not know proportion of the positions that would be interchangeable. However, if the same 96 percent ratio were to exist as it does today then 2,696 total positions would equate to 2,588 coded interchangeable. This reflects elimination of 6,033 71L interchangeable positions. Since women fill 45 percent of the CMF 71 interchangeable positions, this equates to a potential loss of 2,714 women.

As a result of working the TAA 11 process and logistics transformation, the Combined Arms Service Support Command (CASCOM) proposes significant personnel savings in both the

Quartermaster and Transportation Corps. It is anticipated that the Quartermaster Corps could absorb a 12 percent savings and the Transportation Corps a 15 percent savings of existing personnel<sup>38</sup>.

CMF 92 Quartermaster currently has 35,829 spaces of which 80 percent or 28,582 are coded as interchangeable<sup>39</sup>. A 15 percent cut would eliminate 5,374 spaces leaving 30,455 total of which 24,364 would be coded as interchangeable. Women fill 42 percent of the CMF 92 interchangeable positions, and assuming this proportion remains constant; this 15 percent proposed personnel savings would equate to a loss of 1,772 women from the inventory (28,582 – 24,364 = 4,218 x 42 percent).

CMF 88 Transportation currently has 14,990 spaces of which 92 percent or 13,821 are coded as interchangeable<sup>40</sup>. A 12 percent cut would eliminate 1,799 spaces leaving 13,191 total of which 12,136 would be coded as interchangeable. Women fill 24 percent of the CMF 88 interchangeable positions, and assuming this proportion remains constant; this 12 percent proposed personnel savings would equate to a loss of 151 women from the inventory (13,821 – 13,191 = 630 x 24 percent).

#### **THE COMBINED IMPACT OF TRANSFORMATION ON THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN**

The overall impact of these elements of transformation on interchangeable positions and female strength is displayed in Table 13. There is the potential for a loss of 6,591 women when we apply the average of 24 percent female fill against the 16,581 interchangeable position reduction in the Unit of Action design. There is the potential loss of another 2,714 in CMF 71; 1,772 in CMF 92; and 151 in CMF 88 when we apply actual percentages of females filling these CMF interchangeable positions. Total potential female loss equates to 11,228. This figure represents the high-end loss potential because we used the 24 percent average against the Unit of Action reductions. An 11,228 reduction would leave the Army with 51,324 women and take it from 15.5 percent female to 12.7 percent female.

	UNIT OF ACTION STRUCTURE	TAA 09-11 CMF 71	TAA 09-11 CMF 92	TAA 09-11 CMF 88	TOTAL CUTS
STRUCTURE CUTS	16581	6033	4218	630	27462
PERCENT OF					

FEMALES FILLING INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS	24%	45%	42%	24%	
LOSS OF FEMALES	6591	2714	1772	151	11228

TABLE 13. IMPACT OF TRANSFORMATION ON INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS AND FEMALE STRENGTH

Next we will analyze the impact only in the more traditional occupations to get a low-end impact figure. Table 14 displays this analysis. We see that there is a potential to lose 3,740 women in the Administration field, 551 in the Medical field, 2,700 in the Supply & Services field, and 309 in the Transportation field. The total potential female loss is 7,300. This figure represents the low-end loss potential because we are only looking at losses in the traditional occupational fields. There would be female losses in other occupations that have interchangeable positions in the Unit of Action design. A 7,300 reduction would leave the Army with 55,252 women and take it from 15.5 percent female to 13.7 percent female.

STRUCTURE CUTS	UNIT OF ACTION STRUCTURE	TAA 09-11 CUTS	TOTAL CUTS	% FEMALES FILLING INTERCHANGEABLE POSITIONS	LOSS OF FEMALES
ADMIN	2278	6033	8311	45%	3740
MEDICAL	1530		1530	36%	551
SUPPLY&SERVICES	2211	4218	6429	42%	2700
TRANSPORTATION	657	630	1287	24%	309
TOTAL					7300

TABLE 14. IMPACT OF TRANSFORMATION ON TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS AND FEMALE STRENGTH

We can anticipate that transformation as it is defined today has the potential to significantly impact on the continued progress women have made in integrating into the enlisted force. Depending on how we analyze it, female strength could drop from the current 62,552 to anywhere between 51k and 55k. This reduction lowers the female percent of the enlisted force from the current 15.5 percent to between 12.7 and 13.7 percent respectively.

#### **COURSES OF ACTION TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM**

To ensure that transformation does not create unintended consequences in accessions quantity or quality, and does not impede the steady progress women have made in their

opportunity to serve, the Army will need to review its policy concerning the assignment of women. There are three institutional barriers that impede more women from entering into the non-traditional occupations. Until one or more of these barriers are removed, the Army will not foster an environment which will allow for greater opportunities for women to serve. The first barrier is the prohibition of women from serving in virtually all combat arms occupations. The second barrier is that combat units and all positions in those units are coded as male only and are therefore closed to women, even if the occupational field, e.g., administration, supply, food service and medical are open. The third barrier is the Armed Forces Standard Vocational Assessment Battery (ASVAB) which is the entrance test used to match recruits to occupations. The ASVAB screens out some recruits from technical occupations because the test is based on exposure to certain subject matter and experience instead of aptitude<sup>41</sup>. Until the ASVAB is changed to measure aptitude, then the numbers of women who access into the more nontraditional occupations, e.g., mechanic, engineer, air defense artillery and signal will remain low.

Policy change options open for consideration should include the following: 1. Open MOS's currently closed to women, mainly in the combat arms; 2. Recode positions from "male only" to "interchangeable" to allow women opportunities to serve in direct ground combat units in occupations currently open to them, e.g., medic, supply specialist and personnel specialist; and 3. Develop methods to increase the number of women in nontraditional occupations where they are under-represented.

First of all, under any of these courses of action, the Army cannot effectively man the force in the required quantity, and to some degree quality, without retaining or increasing the current level of female accessions. Quantity wise women comprise approximately 20 percent of all accessions<sup>42</sup>. Even taking into account the recent recruiting year successes from 1999-2002, the Army would likely miss its' accession's target if it were to reduce the number of women it recruited. Quality wise, for FY 2000 active component enlisted accessions, 59.58 percent of women accessed scored between I-III A on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, which is considered a "high quality" recruit. On the other hand, 66.77 percent of males scored in that range<sup>43</sup>. Conversely, 91.93 percent of female accessions had a higher high school diploma compared to only 85.01 percent of men<sup>44</sup>. Therefore, if the Army is to continue its quality and quantity recruiting successes in the years to come, women accessions will play a significant role.

The Army could open some or all of its combat arms occupations to women. However, from a manning the force, readiness and cohesion perspective, there is no real need to expand



the opportunities for women through opening up combat arms occupations. It is believed that integration of women into combat arms units lacks both congressional and public support for several reasons. First, from an accessions perspective there is an adequate number of men to fill these positions. Second, doing so would not contribute to unit readiness and cohesion because of women's physical strength and stamina limitations and privacy concerns. Third, servicewomen do not support the involuntary assignment of women to combat arms units. Fourth, women have shown little propensity or desire to serve in combat occupations<sup>45</sup>. Therefore, this course of action is neither suitable nor feasible. While it would expand the opportunities for women to serve, it is unlikely that women would volunteer for these combat arms occupations in any significant numbers to help mitigate the problem.

The Army could allow the assignment of women to all of its direct ground combat units in occupations that are currently open for them to serve. This option would open up positions in administration, personnel, logistics, signal, intelligence, chemical, and medical in units currently closed (infantry, armor, field artillery, combat engineer and air defense artillery battalions). Each of the SBCT's has approximately 473 of these CS/CSS positions; therefore if the Army were to open them to women it would add 2,365 interchangeable positions<sup>46</sup>. The Unit of Action design has three Combined Arms Battalions, a Non-Line of Sight Battalion, and an Aviation Detachment each with no interchangeable positions<sup>47</sup>. Since we do not have MOS level detail on the Unit of Action, it is unknown how many positions would be impacted. If opening these CS/CSS positions in direct ground combat units follows suit with past integration efforts, the impacts on readiness, cohesion and morale of direct combat units would likely be minimal given the proper leadership support and training<sup>48</sup>. Therefore, this course of action is both suitable and feasible, but it is unlikely to expand the opportunities for women to the degree needed to mitigate the problem.

## **CONCLUSION**

This leaves as perhaps the most feasible course of action, the need to access more women applicants into the more nontraditional occupations as a way to ensure the percentage of women and their opportunities to serve are not impeded by transformation. The Army could accomplish this by increasing female fill targets in the more non-traditional occupational specialties and then adjust recruiting strategies and retention incentives to work toward these targets. This course of action will require a retooling of the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery or development of a better way to measure aptitude versus experience as a way to expand the female accessions base.

As the Army moves ahead with transformation we must consider the impact transformation may have on the overall integration of enlisted women in the Army. The continued presence of women in the Army, and in the numbers that preserve readiness and represent integration and inclusion, is both a commitment and requirement. We have the opportunity through policy change options to ensure transformation does not impede this commitment to integration and the requirement to attract recruits in the right quantity and quality to man the force.

WORD COUNT: 7,776



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Margaret C. Harrell, The Status of Gender Integration in the Military (National Defense Research Institute, 2002), 2.

<sup>2</sup> Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, Women in the Army Policy Review, 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> R.W. Sweeney, Jr., Women in the Army, the Right Numbers—the Wrong Skills, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987), 6.

<sup>4</sup> Margaret C. Harrell, The Status of Gender Integration in the Military (National Defense Research Institute, 2002), 3.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel website Number/Percent Women by Component, briefing slide, 1 Jun 01.

<sup>7</sup> The Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) Query, 1 Sep 02.

<sup>8</sup> General Accounting Office, Information on DOD's Assignment Policy and Direct Ground Combat Definition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, October 1998), 2.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) Enlisted MOS Structure Chart, 3 Sep 02.

<sup>10</sup> R.W. Sweeney, Jr., Women in the Army, the Right Numbers—the Wrong Skills, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987), 4.

<sup>11</sup> The Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) Query, 1 Sep 02.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) Enlisted MOS Structure Chart, 3 Sep 02.

<sup>15</sup> The Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) Query, 1 Sep 02.

<sup>16</sup> Accessions Program Data Base (APROG) Query, 1 Oct 02.

<sup>17</sup> The Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) Query, 1 Sep 02.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> R.W. Sweeney, Jr., Women in the Army, the Right Numbers—the Wrong Skills, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987), 8.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Arthur P. McMahan, Female United States Army Personnel in Traditional and Nontraditional Jobs: A Comparison of Their Perceptions of the Quality and Atmosphere of Training, (Virginia Commonwealth University 1996), 82-83.

<sup>22</sup> The Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) Query, 1 Sep 02.

<sup>23</sup> R.W. Sweeney, Jr., Women in the Army, the Right Numbers—the Wrong Skills, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987), 8.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Arthur P. McMahan, Female United States Army Personnel in Traditional and Nontraditional Jobs: A Comparison of Their Perceptions of the Quality and Atmosphere of Training, (Virginia Commonwealth University 1996), 82-83.

<sup>26</sup> The Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) Query, 1 Sep 02.

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate Planning Guidance.

<sup>29</sup> Hans Binnendijk, Transforming America's Military (The Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2002), 109.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*, 117.

<sup>31</sup> Personnel Manning Authorization Document, 1 Oct 02.

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Unit of Action Design Briefing Slides, 29 Oct 02.

<sup>34</sup> Personnel Manning Authorization Document, 1 Oct 02.

<sup>35</sup> The Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) Query, 1 Sep 02.

<sup>36</sup> Adjutant General School, 71 Drawdown Update, Briefing Slides, 2 Oct 02.

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> Logistics Transformation Task Force, TAA 11 Recommendations, Decision Paper, 1 Oct 02.

<sup>39</sup> The Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) Query, 1 Sep 02.

<sup>40</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> General Accounting Office, Trends in the Occupational Distribution of Military Women (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1999), 30.

<sup>42</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), Population Representation in the Military Services, (Washington, D.C., February 2002), 2-13.

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, B-7.

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.*, B-10.

<sup>45</sup> General Accounting Office Report, Information on DOD's Assignment Policy and Direct Ground Combat Definition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, October 1998), 4.

<sup>46</sup> The Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) Query, 1 Sep 02.

<sup>47</sup> Unit of Action Design Briefing Slides, 29 Oct 02.

<sup>48</sup> Margaret C. Harrell, New Opportunities for Military Women, (National Defense Research Institute, 1997), 99.



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